Introduction
The aim of this research is to provide new evidence on the transmission of monetary policy in China. This question is of high importance as banks play a key role in the Chinese financial system and provide most of the funding to firms. 1 We investigate the effectiveness of the bank lending channel which is a key mechanism for the transmission of monetary policy.
The bank lending channel is based on the idea that, owing to imperfect substitutability between bank lending and bonds, monetary policy influences the supply of bank loans.
A monetary policy tightening increases the opportunity cost of holding deposits, resulting in a decrease in bank lending in line with the reduction in funding sources. It has been widely investigated in the US and in Europe (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Altunbas, Fazylov and Molyneux, 2002; Gambacorta, 2005; Fungacova, Solanko and Weill, 2014) , but less so in
China (Gunji and Yuan, 2010) .
Contrary to advanced economies, however, Chinese monetary policy relies on a wide palette of instruments. In addition to traditional price-based instruments such as interest rates, the central bank uses quantity-based instruments such as the reserve requirement ratio and less orthodox "window guidance" policies. Most policy decisions, including interest rate changes, must first be cleared with the State Council before they are implemented. In the case of the reserve requirement ratio (RRR), however, the People's Bank of China (PBC) retains direct control. This particular instrument is thus seen to play a special role in Chinese monetary policy. Indeed, the PBC's reliance on the RRR has increased since the mid-2000s (Ma, Xiandong and Xi, 2013) .
Impliedly then, gauging the monetary policy transmission mechanism in China involves assessing the effectiveness of this monetary policy tool. In most developed countries, monetary policy is implemented through standard tools such as open market operations and the discount rate. Reserve requirements have either been phased out or are used for other motives. 2 China, however, is an excellent example of a country, where reserve requirements 1 Bank loans are the largest source of external funding for firms comprising 75% of all external funding sources at the end of 2010. 2 The active use of reserve requirements as a monetary policy instrument, however, has been quite common in developing countries, where undeveloped financial markets may limit the efficiency of market-based instruments. For the period 1970 , Federico, Vegh and Vuletin (2014 find that 32 out of the 52 countries studied were engaged in active RRR policy, and most of them were developing economies. In contrast, the role of RRR in developed countries as a policy tool seemed to be on the wane. The authors note that none of the major industrial countries studied had engaged in active RRR policy since 2004. In contrast, over half of the developing countries in their sample had done so. Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) also show that several developing countries have turned to the RRR instrument to mitigate the impact of large capital flows.
are used intensively as a regular policy tool. 3 The reserve requirement ratio was adjusted ten times in 2007 alone, and then changed another 24 times between 2008 and 2013. In comparison, this ratio was changed only once in the Eurozone since the creation of the euro in 1999.
Moreover, reserve requirement ratios in China can vary from bank to bank. Since 2008, separate RRRs are set and reported for large, medium-sized, and small banks, as well as rural credit cooperatives. Glocker and Towbin (2015) argue that for reserve requirements to be an effective policy instrument two conditions need to be met: banks cannot easily substitute away from deposits as a funding source and firms cannot easily substitute away from bank credit. China fulfills both of these conditions.
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of changing reserve requirement ratios on the transmission of the monetary policy through the bank lending channel in China.
To this end, we analyze the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy actions using the methodology of Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) . Following this approach, the existence of the bank lending channel is identified when banks react differently to shifts in monetary policy actions based on differences in size, capitalization, or liquidity as these factors influence access to external funding that in turn impacts their ability to supply loans. This methodology is commonly used in the literature on the bank lending channel (e.g. Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Fungacova, Solanko and Weill, 2014) . We also apply it here.
The paper contributes to the literature on two fronts. First, it provides evidence on how adjustments in reserve requirements influence bank lending in China. We also consider other monetary policy tools, including the benchmark lending rate to assess whether reserve requirement ratios are more effective than other monetary policy instruments. As such, the impact of reserve requirement ratios is of prime concern not only in absolute terms but also relative to other monetary policy tools.
Second, this work helps clarify how bank ownership influences transmission of monetary policy. Bhaumik, Dang and Kutan (2011) note that, in the case of Indian banks, ownership exerts an impact on the reaction of banks to monetary policy changes. Here we ask whether the effectiveness of changes in reserve requirements is influenced by the ownership structure of the bank. The Chinese banking industry is characterized by the coexistence of several bank ownership formats. In addition to the huge state-owned banks, there are while there is a large strand of literature on the consequences of ownership structure of banks in China with regard to competition and efficiency (e.g. Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009; Fungacova, Pessarossi and Weill, 2013) , the influence of bank ownership on transmission of monetary policy has been largely ignored.
In our empirical analysis, we augment Bankscope's bank-level financial statement data for Chinese banks with hand-collected data from annual reports of individual banks from their websites. Unlike previous studies on Chinese banks that only use data for the largest or listed banks (e.g. Gunji and Yuan, 2010) , we include over 170 banks in our dataset.
These banks account for the vast majority of Chinese banking sector assets. The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main elements of the monetary policy in China. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 develops the methodology. Section 5 presents the findings and section 6 concludes.
Monetary policy in China
In this section, we describe the monetary policy framework in China and discuss the characteristics of various types of banks in China. We finish with a brief review of the empirical literature on monetary policy in China. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of monetary policy is the PBC's active reliance on the RRR, i.e. the share of deposits banks must hold in central bank reserves. Indeed, the RRR is considered to be one of the most important policy instruments in China. Changes in reserve requirements tend to signal policy intent to tighten or loosen bank lending, and hence, the monetary policy stance. The RRR was adjusted more often in our observation period Ma, Xiandong and Xi (2013) . 6 In addition, foreign currency deposits are subject to smaller reserve requirements than RMB deposits. 7 This classification is relatively opaque. Ma, Xiandong and Xi (2013, p. 124) explain that the highest RRR ratio is "for the six or seven largest commercial banks." In other words, it concerns the "Big Five" and one or two other large banks. Rural credit cooperatives and other small financial institutions are subject to lower reserve requirement ratios than most other banks.
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The recent literature on the monetary policy transmission using the different instruments in China offers somewhat contradictory findings. He, Leung and Chong (2013) find that, in the period 1998-2010, the Chinese economy responded strongly to total lending and money supply shocks, but only mildly to shocks from the benchmark lending rate, market interest rate, and other "market-based" shocks. Fernald, Spiegel & Swanson (2014) provide an opposite finding, whereby the RRR and benchmark interest rate instruments were found to be effective in determining inflation and economic activity in 2000-2013. They also test the standard quantity-based measures, i.e. money supply and loan growth, but find their roles to be insignificant, providing evidence that the monetary policy transmission mechanism in China is beginning to look 'more standard'.
Relevant to this discussion, we find just one study (Gunji and Yuan, 2010 ) that uses the approach of Kashyap & Stein (1995 , 2000 on the bank lending channel in China. Gunji 
Methodology
To investigate the presence of the bank lending channel, we rely on the empirical model that is based on the theoretical framework of Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and extended by Ehrmann et al. (2001 Ehrmann et al. ( , 2003 . This model has been frequently employed in studies investigating the bank lending channel. The estimated equation has the form:
where i identifies the bank and t is the time period (year); Lit denotes total loans by bank i at time t to private non-banking sectors, MP denotes the monetary policy indicator, and GDP is real GDP growth. Bank-specific characteristics are denoted by Xi. To ease possible endogeneity problem, these variables are lagged one period. The model further includes a bankspecific fixed effect ai.
The main monetary policy indicator we employ in our analysis is China's reserve requirement ratio. We consider the change in the average RRR between the years. Since 2008, this ratio has been separately set and reported for large banks, small and medium-sized banks, as well as rural credit cooperatives.
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Consistent with the bank lending channel literature, we consider three bank-specific characteristics: bank size, capitalization, and liquidity. All of these factors influence a bank's access to external funding, which further impacts the bank's ability to supply loans. In an episode of monetary tightening, high levels of liquidity may also allow the bank to draw on its own liquid funds rather than resort to the market. Following Ehrmann et al. (2003) , we define bank characteristics as:
where i=1, …, N identifies the bank, and t=1,…., T is the time period (year).
We measure bank size using logarithm of total assets (A). Capitalization is defined as the ratio of the bank's equity capital (C) to total assets. Liquidity is the share of liquid 
Main results
We examine the influence of reserve requirements on the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. The estimations are displayed in (3), i.e. the period including the emergence and fallout from the global financial crisis, as well as China's fiscal easing carried out mainly through increased bank lending. 13 We obtain several findings.
First, we find evidence that loan growth is adversely affected by a tightening of reserve requirements. The coefficient of reserve requirements, which captures the direct impact of monetary policy on loan growth, is significant and negative in all estimations, in line with the expectations. An increase (decrease) in reserve requirements leads to a decrease (increase) in loan growth rate. Hence, we support the view that reserve requirements are an effective monetary policy instrument.
Second, the monetary policy interaction terms for liquidity and size are overall not significant, meaning that both of these bank-specific characteristics do not influence how bank lending reacts to changes in monetary policy. In addition, the interaction term between monetary policy and capitalization is significant, but negative. Our results for the monetary policy interaction terms do not support the existence of a bank lending channel in China through the use of reserve requirements. The literature on the bank lending channel (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000, 2006) predicts that banks with lower capitalization, liquidity, and size, are expected to boost their credit supply, yet we observe no such results. We find evidence of an asymmetric loan response with respect to capitalization, but it does not accord with the prediction that contractionary monetary policy should have more severe effects on capital-constrained banks in line with the evidence provided by Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006) .
In analyzing the other variables, we point out that the coefficients of capitalization and liquidity are significant and positive, while they are significant and negative for size in all estimations. These results mean that well-capitalized, highly liquid, small banks achieve more robust loan growth than other banks. We also observe that changes in economic activity, measured by GDP growth, are positively related to loan growth. Interestingly, these results are similar to those observed in e.g. Eurozone countries (Fungacova, Solanko and Weill, 2014) .
In a nutshell, our estimations show that the RRR does not influence monetary policy through the bank lending channel, even if it exerts an impact on loan growth.
Alternative monetary policy instruments
Our evidence that reserve requirements do not affect loan growth through the bank lending channel raises the question of whether this result is specific to this monetary policy instrument or general conclusion to all monetary policy instruments in China. Former studies on this issue provide ample warning that evidence on the bank lending channel in China should not be taken for granted. Gunji and Yuan (2010) find limited evidence only for the influence of size on the transmission of monetary policy.
We perform estimations with two alternative monetary policy measures: the 7-day interbank rate and the benchmark lending rate
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. The PBC regularly adjusts the benchmark rates to influence bank credit in China, while the interbank rate can be seen to more broadly reflect policy conditions in the interbank market (Figure 1 ). The interbank rate is also a common proxy for monetary policy in the bank lending channel literature. In any case, all of these are often used as monetary policy instruments in China (e.g. Gunji and Yuan, 2010) . Second, the interaction terms between monetary policy instruments and the three bank-specific characteristics are never significantly positive. In most cases, they are not significant. Only the interaction term with size is negative and significant for the lending rate.
This result again indicates no support for the bank lending channel. Smaller banks, as well as less-capitalized or less-liquid banks, do not experience greater increases in their credit supply when monetary policy is relaxed.
As a consequence, the main conclusion is that the RRR cannot be considered a different monetary policy tool from the effectiveness perspective. On the one hand, changes in reserve requirements contribute in the same way as changes in the interbank rate, or lending rate to influence loan growth. Tightening of any of these instruments deteriorates loan growth. The PBC can use the RRR or different interest rate instruments in a similar way to influence loan growth. On the other hand, changes in reserve requirements do not influence loan supply through the bank lending channel, nor do changes in any of the interest rates.
Hence, reserve requirements are an effective monetary policy instrument in China, even if the transmission does not go through the bank lending channel. The reason for this result is not related to the nature of this instrument, but to the absence of the bank lending channel in China.
All in all, our study tends to support the view of the absence of bank lending channel in China. This finding is not at odds with former studies. As stressed above, related studies are still scarce. The closest, Gunji and Yuan (2010) , which uses a limited sample of 19 large
Chinese banks in a period ending in 2007, also finds limited evidence.
Estimations by ownership type
Our findings on the bank lending channel have been obtained for the whole sample of banks.
However, the Chinese banking industry is composed of different types of banks in terms of In the case of China, Gunji and Yuan (2010) perform separate estimations on the five largest Chinese banks and on the 14 joint-stock banks of their sample to investigate the bank lending channel. They do not observe differences between these categories of banks:
the interaction terms between the three bank-specific characteristics and monetary policy instruments are not significant for any of these subsamples. However, their sample is limited solely to these two categories of banks.
To test the hypothesis that ownership influences the bank lending channel, we perform new estimations by adding four interaction terms to our main regressions. We create five dummy variables corresponding to each bank ownership type: Big Five, joint-stock banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks, and foreign banks. We add an interaction variable between the difference in reserve requirements and each bank type dummy variable in a separate regression to consider the possibility that changes in reserve requirements exert a different influence on loan growth based on ownership type. We perform five estimations by considering separately each type of banks. Every time we include three interaction variables between the difference in reserve requirements, each bank-specific characteristic (capitalization, liquidity, size), and each bank type dummy variable. This way, the results are easier to interpret to find out if any ownership type differs from the others regarding the transmission of monetary policy changes. Table 4 displays the results. Each column corresponds to the estimations for one type of bank.
First, we observe that the impact of changes in reserve requirements on loan growth differs across types of banks. The interaction term between the monetary policy indicator and the type of bank is significantly negative for city commercial banks and for rural commercial banks, while it is significantly positive for foreign banks. These results suggest that Second, we find some differences concerning the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel across banks. The interaction term for capitalization is significantly positive for Big Five, meaning that less-capitalized Big Five banks tend to increase their credit supply more following a reduction of RRR. The interaction term for size is significantly positive for city commercial banks. Smaller city commercial banks enhance their credit supply in a greater extent following a decrease of RRR. This suggests some limited evidence for the bank lending channel for these types of banks.
We also observe two interaction terms that are significantly negative and at odds with the bank lending channel: the interaction term for liquidity for rural commercial banks and the interaction term for capitalization for foreign banks.
All the other interaction terms with ownership dummy variables are not significant, meaning that these bank-specific characteristics do not influence the manner in which bank lending reacts to monetary policy changes differently depending on the type of banks.
We extend the analysis of the influence of ownership type by considering the other monetary policy measures (7-day interbank rate and 1-year PBC benchmark lending rate) to investigate whether the RRR differs from other monetary policy measures and has different impact on the transmission of monetary policy when accounting for different bank ownership types. The results are reported in tables 5 and 6.
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The first finding is that the influence of monetary policy changes on loan growth differs across bank types. For all monetary policy instruments, we observe that the interaction term between monetary policy and city commercial banks is significantly negative, while the interaction term between monetary policy and foreign banks is significantly positive. Both of these findings corroborate with what is observed for reserve requirements, i.e. loan growth of city commercial banks is more adversely affected by a tightening of any monetary policy instrument, while loan growth of foreign banks is less hampered by such tightening.
The interaction term between monetary policy and rural commercial banks is significantly negative with the benchmark rate, but not with the interbank rate. It is also significantly negative with reserve requirements. This tends to support the view that a tightening of monetary policy hampers loan growth of rural commercial banks more than for other banks.
We also find differences across monetary policy instruments for joint-stock banks.
The interaction term between monetary policy and the dummy variable for such banks is negative in all estimations, and only significant when the interbank rate is considered as the monetary policy instrument. This additional finding supports the conclusion that monetary policy instruments can have different impacts on different types of banks.
The second finding deals with the limited evidence on the bank lending channel.
Interestingly, we observe exactly the same findings with the benchmark rate as with the RRR. First, we have some limited evidence for the bank lending channel for Big Five and for city commercial banks, with significantly positive coefficients for capitalization and for size, respectively. Second, two interaction terms are significantly negative. This does not accord with the bank lending channel, i.e. the interaction term for liquidity for rural commercial banks and the interaction term for capitalization for foreign banks. Third, none of the other interaction terms with ownership dummy variables is statistically significant. To sum up, the estimations based on the bank ownership type provide two major conclusions. First, the ownership type influences the impact of changes in reserve requirements on loan growth. This result also stands for alternative monetary policy measures, and supports the view that the ownership structure of the banking industry affects the transmission of monetary policy. We can relate this conclusion to the finding of Bhaumik, Dang and Kutan (2011) on Indian banks that, based on their ownership type, react differently to changes in monetary policy.
Second, we see some differences across bank types for the transmission of changes in reserve requirements through the bank lending channel. We observe that the well-capitalized Big Five banks and larger city commercial banks are better able to buffer their lending activity against restrictive monetary policies. Some leads supporting the existence of the bank lending channel through alternative monetary policy indicators are also observed.
These findings moderate our conclusion on the absence of a bank lending channel in China for all banks, because they provide a degree of evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel for certain types of banks. Consequently, they complement our investigation on the full sample of banks and stress the importance of taking ownership type into account.
Conclusion
This paper examines the transmission of monetary policy in China, where the implementation of monetary policy differs from other countries in terms of frequent adjustments of reserve requirements. It therefore provides a relevant framework to investigate how reserve requirements can affect the bank lending channel. We note three main findings.
First, the bank lending channel is not effective through reserve requirements in China. However, this conclusion also stands for changes in other monetary policy measures.
Therefore, our results support the absence of the bank lending channel in China.
Second, changes in reserve requirements influence loan growth directly. We find that a tightening in reserve requirements adversely influences loan growth. Thus, our results support the effectiveness of monetary policy through reserve requirements in China. We obtain the same finding for the other monetary policy instruments. In other words, monetary policy is effective through multiple instruments including reserve requirements.
Third, the ownership structure of the banking industry influences the transmission of monetary policy. The impact of changes in reserve requirements on loan growth differs In terms of channels of transmission, the bank lending channel does not play a major role in the transmission of monetary policy in China. Rather, the transmission seems to take place through other channels. Additionally, it means that monetary policy could be strengthened in China when taking into account the potential influence of the bank lending channel to favor transmission of monetary policy.
In terms of banking structure, our findings reveal that the ownership structure of banking industry influences the transmission of monetary policy in China. As a consequence, the changes in the ownership structure can foster or hamper the effectiveness of the monetary policy. Therefore, banking policies to promote privatization or foreign bank entry should not be implemented without considering their impacts on monetary policy transmission.
Figures and tables Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in reserve requirements ratios. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level. Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in the instrument mentioned at the top of the column. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level.
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Reserve requirements and the bank lending channel in China 30 Table 4 Estimations by ownership type with reserve requirements Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in reserve requirements ratios. We perform five estimations by considering separately each type of banks. Every time we include interaction variables between the difference in reserve requirements, each bank-specific characteristic (capitalization, liquidity, size), and each bank type dummy variable.The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level. Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in 7-day interbank rate. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level.
Reserve requirements and the bank lending channel in China 32 Table 6 Estimations by ownership type with lending rate Panel estimations with bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is the loan growth rate. The monetary policy variable is the difference in deposit rate. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10 %, 5 % or 1 % level.
